Representation and learning in motor action – bridges between experimental research and cognitive robotics. by Schack, Thomas & Ritter, Helge
e at SciVerse ScienceDirect
New Ideas in Psychology 31 (2013) 258–269Contents lists availablNew Ideas in Psychology
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/newideapsychRepresentation and learning in motor action – Bridges
between experimental research and cognitive robotics
Thomas Schack a,c,d,*, Helge Ritter b,c,d
aDepartment of Neurocognition and Action Biomechanics, Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany
bNeuroinformatics Group, Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany
cCITEC – Center of Excellence “Cognitive Interaction Technology”, Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany
dResearch Institute for Cognition and Robotics, CoR-Lab, Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, GermanyKeywords:
Representation
Learning
Cognitive robotics
Interaction
Long-term-memory
Manual action* Corresponding author. Bielefeld University,
Action-Department, Center of Excellence “Cognitive
logy”, Postbus 100 131, 33501 Bielefeld, Germany. Te
E-mail addresses: thomas.schack@uni-bielefeld.d
techfak.uni-bielefeld.de (H. Ritter).
0732-118X/$ – see front matter  2013 Elsevier Ltd
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2013.04.00a b s t r a c t
To gain a better understanding of the functionality of representation and categorization in
action and interaction, it is fundamental that researchers understand how movements are
represented in long-term memory. It is our position that human motor control requires
that our actions be planned and represented in terms of intended perceptual effects and
future task demands, and that the individual has a well-structured mental representation
of the task so that the movement can be carried out successfully. Basic Action Concepts
(BACs) are identiﬁed as major building blocks of cognitive representation in long-term
memory, which are cognitive tools used to master the functional demands of movement
tasks. In this paper, we consider relevant issues in research methodology and present an
experimental method that can be used to assess action-relevant representational struc-
tures. This method permits us to observe the strong relationship between cognitive rep-
resentation and performance in manual action. For example, the speciﬁc differences in the
mental representations of participants are strongly related to skill level, as well as
biomechanical and task constraints. We then discuss results from our learning experi-
ments, where we have examined the development and changes in cognitive representa-
tion over time. From these experiments we have found that cognitive reference structures
include task-speciﬁc spatial information, which provides the basis for action control in
skilled voluntary movement. We have implemented these results on various robotic
platforms. We argue that the insights gained from various experimental approaches in the
ﬁeld of cognitive psychology and motor control enable researchers to explore the possi-
bilities and limitations of artiﬁcial control architectures in robot systems. Finally, we argue
that this is not a unidirectional process. Researchers from the ﬁeld of cognitive psychology
and motor control can proﬁt from the advances in technological systems, which enhance
the understanding of human motor control in skilled voluntary action.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Neurocognition and
Interaction Techno-
l.: þ49 521 106 5127.
e (T. Schack), helge@
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31. Introduction
In his now seminal work, “The accuracy of voluntary
movement”, Woodworth (1899) stated that “in all sorts of
psychology, save one, there is of late an increasing interest
in the motor side of consciousness. In short, the evident
fact that man is not merely perceptive and intellectual, but
distinctly active or reactive, is being pushed to a position in
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(p. 1). When such a declaration was made more than 100
years ago it is surprising that the recent situation in psy-
chology andmotor control research can be characterized as
the positive crisis of cognitive motor control research. Motor
control research has received little attention and has even
been called the “Cinderella of psychology” (Rosenbaum,
2005). But it may also be said motor control research has
ignored higher cognitive functions to some extent and
particularly neglected the interaction between different
modules and levels of action organization (see Schack &
Tenenbaum, 2004a, 2004b).
Over the last 30 years, motor control research has been
dominated by two perspectives: the motor approach, and
the dynamic systems theory. The motor approach is pri-
marily concerned with understanding howmovements are
controlled. For example, the theory of generalized motor
programs (Schmidt & Lee, 2005) suggests that the temporal
and spatial muscle patterns in a movement are determined
by certain parameters. Parameters deemed invariant (e.g.,
relative duration, relative force, muscular activation pat-
terns) are stored in long-term memory, and are funda-
mental to the motor program. Parameters considered to be
variant (e.g., absolute duration and absolute force) also
need to be planned for motor performance, but are handled
in a situation-speciﬁc way.
In contrast, the ecological or dynamical systems
perspective is concerned with the basic laws of self-
organization (drawn from biology and physics) and
describing behavior in nonlinear dynamic terms, rather
than elucidating or understanding the cognitive compo-
nents of motor control. For instance, the ecological theory
of affordances assumes that individuals pick up task-
relevant cues in a direct manner, and that these cues pro-
vide the actor with information for skill selection that does
not necessarily rely on cognitive components, such as
motor memory or perceptual categories (e.g. Gibson, 1977).
In the later part of the 20th century, the dispute over these
approaches was described as a paradigm crisis (Abernethy
& Sparrow, 1992); however in more recent years the debate
between these two perspectives seems to have entered a
stalemate, “with both sides agreeing to disagree”
(Summers, 1998).
Although the motor approach and dynamic systems still
dominate the ﬁeld of motor control, in recent years new
perspectives have emerged through which human
behavior can be described and understood. The new per-
spectives show remarkable similarities in that they
emphasize the goal-directedness of actions, the importance
of anticipated perceptual effects, and the crucial role of
mental representations in action control; however, they are
not aligned with either side in the now-traditional debate.
These are perceptual-cognitive approaches, proposing that
voluntary movements are planned and performed with the
help of structured cognitive representations of action ef-
fects in motor memory (Hoffmann, Butz, Herbort, Kiesel, &
Lenhard, 2007; Hommel, Muesseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz,
2001; Mechsner, Kerzel, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2001; Schack &
Mechsner, 2006). Furthermore, because these representa-
tions govern the tuning of motor commands and muscular
activity patterns, skillful coordination occurs whenappropriate mental representations of the motor task and
action goals are constructed.
This perceptual-cognitive approach to movement con-
trol is reminiscent of classical ideas in psychology, such as
the “ideomotor” approach adopted by Lotze (1852) and
James (1890) in the 19th century or the model-theory
studies of the construction of movement presented by
Bernstein (1947) in the middle of the 20th century. This
perspective never disappeared completely; but it was
eclipsed by the dominant division of labor between the
cognitive and dynamical systems approaches to motor
control. More recently, there has been the suggestion that a
perceptual-cognitive framework (or architecture) for motor
action might ﬁll the void left by these two dominant
perspectives.
An important reason for the new interest in a cognitive-
perceptual and architectural understanding of action in
psychology is the impressive development of cognitive
robotics. Current robotic technology has matured to the
point that it can approximate a reasonable spectrum of
isolated perceptual, cognitive, and motor capabilities.
These advances have enabled researchers to explore how
these functions might be integrated into a meaningful ar-
chitecture for controlling robotic action. These cognitive-
perceptual approaches also provide an opportunity to ﬁt
models on cognitive andmotor related levels together with
implementation architectures and simulations generated
for robot actions. Because psychology traditionally relies
more on phenomena-oriented theories with a narrow
range of coverage than on architectural theories, cognitive
robotics can help to develop a more uniﬁed, architectural
understanding of human action (see Pezzulo & Calvi, 2011;
Schack, 2010). This is a new opportunity to integrate the
investigation of motor control phenomena into the exper-
imental study of action-based cognition and to address the
interaction between motor and cognitive processes exper-
imentally. Among the key issues to be addressed in this
paper are how structured cognitive representations can
arise during motor skill acquisition and how these under-
lying processes can be simulated so that they can be
replicated on robotic platforms. Working toward this goal,
we will translate our ﬁndings in studies of motor control
and cognitive representations in humans into models that
can guide the implementation of cognitive robotic
architectures.
2. Cognitive representation
From an evolutionary and from a learning perspective,
conscious cognitive functions can be assumed to emerge
from more elementary functions. Whereas elementary
functions (e.g., reﬂexes) are inﬂuenced directly by stimulus
constellations, mental control functions are guided inten-
tionally; they are regulated by the self. For example, it is not
possible for a mentally controlled action to emerge from
the grasp reﬂex in humans. In fact, this reﬂex has to be
actively inhibited before verbal or other cognitive tools can
be applied and a goal-directed action can be formed.
Should children, at this point in their development, fail to
develop any inhibitory activity, they will not be able to
manipulate objects at all. All they will be capable of is a
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an ontogenetically more advanced level to associations
(between stimuli and action schemes) that were appro-
priate at one time in the past, but have now become both
automated and purposeless. From such a point of view
cognitive representations have to integrate and organize
“lower-level” building blocks or codes (see also Perrig &
Hofer, 1989; Viviani, 1986). Within such a system or ar-
chitecture, learning can be treated as a product of devel-
oping and modifying the mediating cognitive-perceptual
structures in motor memory.
The cognitive-perceptual representations used in action
control might involve different formats such as proposi-
tions, relational structures of many kinds, and concepts.
Researchers from different ﬁelds, such as cognitive
psychology, cognitive robotics and sport psychology
(Maycock et al., 2010; Schack, 2004a, 2004b; Schack &
Mechsner, 2006; Schack & Ritter, 2009; Tenenbaum et al.,
2009), have provided evidence for so-called basic action
concepts (BACs) in the control of human movements.
Analogous to the well-established notion of basic concepts
for objects (Rosch, 1978), BACs are meant to be the mental
counterparts of functionally relevant elementary compo-
nents or transitional states (body postures) of complex
movements. BACs are based on the cognitive chunking of
body postures and movement events concerning common
functions in realizing action goals. They do not refer to
behavior-related invariance properties of objects, as in the
case in basic object concepts, but to perception-linked
invariance properties of movements.
How such BACs are integrated into higher-order repre-
sentation structures has been investigated and simulated
with different methods (see Krause, Dürr, Bläsing, & Schack,
2010; Maycock et al., 2010; Schack, 2004a). Based on an
experimental approach Schack and Mechsner (2006)
studied the tennis serve to investigate the nature and role
of long-term memory in skilled athletic performance. In
high-level experts, these representational frameworks
were organized in a distinctive hierarchical tree-like
structure, were remarkably similar between individuals,
and were well matched with the functional and biome-
chanical demands of the task. In comparison, action rep-
resentations in low-level players and non-players were
organized less hierarchically, were more variable between
persons, and were less well matched with functional and
biomechanical demands.
The results from a number of different activities (e.g.,
golf, soccer, wind surﬁng, volleyball, gymnastics, dancing)
have demonstrated that mental representation structures
are functionally related to performance and to expertise
(Bläsing, Puttke, & Schack, 2010; Bläsing, Tenenbaum, &
Schack, 2009; Schack, 2004a; Schack & Bar-Eli, 2007;
Schack & Hackfort, 2007; Velentzas, Heinen, & Schack,
2011).
Furthermore, as shown in a volleyball study (Schack,
2004a, 2004b), these mental representation structures
are position- and thereby task-dependent. Such represen-
tation structures are the outcome of an increasing, effort-
reducing formation of order in long term memory (LTM).
The order that has been formed is clearly related to the
structure of the movement. With increasing expertise, therepresentation of the movement corresponds more and
more to its topological (spatiotemporal) structure.
Accordingly, movement control becomes possible by rep-
resenting the anticipated perceptual effects of the move-
ment and comparing them with incoming perceptual
effects.
From such a point of view the structure of cognitive
representations in long term memory is also relevant for
perception and visuomotor control in motor action. But
little is known about the relationship of cognitive repre-
sentations and visuomotor control for complex move-
ments. Therefore, we investigated the extent to which
novices and skilled high-jump athletes are able to uncon-
sciously identify visually presented body postures of the
high jump. We also asked whether or not the manner of
processing differs (qualitatively or quantitatively) between
these groups as a function of their cognitive representation
and motor expertise. An experiment with stimuli not
consciously perceivable (speciﬁcally, body postures in the
high jump) was designed to determine whether subliminal
priming of movement phases affects target processing.
Participants had to decide which phase of the high jump
(approach vs. ﬂight) a target photograph was taken from.
We found a main effect of temporal order for skilled ath-
letes, that is, faster reaction times for prime-target pairs
that reﬂected the natural movement order as opposed to
the reversed movement order. For novices, data analyses
revealed an interaction between temporal order and
movement phases: only the reversed movement order of
ﬂight-approach pictures increased processing time. Taken
together, the results of this study suggest that the structure
of cognitive movement representation modulates uncon-
scious processing of movement pictures and points to a
functional role of cognitive motor representations in visual
perception (Güldenpenning, Koester, Kunde, Weigelt, &
Schack, 2011).
To learn more about different types and formats of such
motor representation we studied the relationship between
represented activities and the body schema (Bläsing,
Schack, & Brugger, 2010). The body schema has been
described as the multimodal representation of the body
that integrates somatosensory, proprioceptive, vestibular
and visual information. Therefore, we investigated the
mental representation of body parts and related activities in
two individuals with congenitally absent limbs. One of the
individuals was born without forearms and legs, and
perceived phantoms of all four limbs, while the other in-
dividual was born without hands and arms and has two
shortened legs with only one functionally intact foot, but
has never experienced any phantom sensation. We
measured cognitive action and body representations of
these two individuals and compared their results to those
of a group of paraplegic wheelchair athletes, and of a group
of individuals with physically intact limbs. Results of the
groups of physically intact subjects and the group of
paraplegic subjects reﬂect modularity of the body schema
(Haggard & Wolpert, 2005), with separate clusters for the
lower body, upper body, ﬁngers and head. In contrast, the
representation structure of the participant with congenital
phantom limbs more closely resembled the structure of
the matched control group, than the structure for the
T. Schack, H. Ritter / New Ideas in Psychology 31 (2013) 258–269 261participant with congenitally absent limbs but without
phantoms. The results provide evidence for a strong inter-
action of cognitive motor representation and cognitive
body representations on a functional level. It seems that
body representation and cognitive integration of percep-
tual body information are strongly inﬂuenced by cognitive
motor representations (Bläsing, Schack, et al., 2010).
Based on these andmany other studies, the main idea in
our understanding of human motion is that major in-
terfaces in the architecture of movement are cognitive in
nature. Such a perspective does not view the motor system
as being distinct from cognition. Instead, it considers both
conscious and automatized processes of movement orga-
nization to be based functionally on cognitive representa-
tion structures that can be described with precision. This
does not ignore the signiﬁcance of emotional or motiva-
tional processes; it simply puts them to one side so that we
can focus on the cognitive architecture of movement. In the
next section we will provide some insights into the cogni-
tive background of human grasping and in the functional
role of cognitive representations in manual action.
3. Cognitive representation and biomechanical
factors in manual action
Today, highly developed anthropoids, humans, and – to
some extent – robots are able to perform manual actions.
Manual actions allow for some sort of object-related or-
ganism–environment interaction and represent cognitive
operations (speciﬁcally, classiﬁcations). Based on grasping
movements, anthropoids can identify physically different
objects as functionally equivalent tools for solving typical
behavioral problems (such manipulating a screw). In an-
thropoids it has been possible to conﬁrm the formation of
cognitive concepts in manual action (Rensch, 1973). As
current studies show, human grasping movements are
cognitively represented on the basis of movement concepts
(e.g., Basic Action Concepts) and build on effect-oriented
target codes (in relation to space rather than to the body;
Rosenbaum, Cohen, Jax, Van Der Wel, & Weiss, 2007;
Schack, 2004a; Schack & Ritter, 2009).
Hence, the perceptual-cognitive control of arm and
hand movements has become a topic of study in psychol-
ogy, biomechanics, cognitive motion science, cognitive
robotics, and bio-cybernetics. To understand the biome-
chanical and cognitive background of manual action in
more detail, we established lines of research on the
movement primitives of manual action, with the help of
biomechanical and cognitive analyses. Because the pro-
duction of manual actions is affected by such factors as
biomechanical constraints (Rosenbaum, Meulenbroek,
Vaughan, & Jansen, 2001; Weigelt, Kunde, & Prinz, 2006),
we have carried out some developmental studies on the
relationship between biomechanical constraints like the
end-state-comfort effect and the cognitive representation
of grasping postures in children (Stöckel, Hughes, & Schack,
2012). Other studies have explored the link between se-
mantic and motor memory, especially in the case of
grasping (Weigelt, Rosenbaum, Hülshorst, & Schack, 2009).
Cognitive robotics has a strong interest in questions
regarding the segmentation of armmovements, the controlof robot actuators via neural networks (e.g. Self-Organizing
Maps or SOM; Barreto, Araujo, & Ritter, 2003), and the
combination of learning strategies for motion primitives in
grasping movements (Steil, Röthling, Haschke, & Ritter,
2004).
To strengthen links between experimental research and
robotics, we have studied cognitive representations not in
isolation but as parts of a cognitive action architecture
(Maycock et al., 2010; Schack & Ritter, 2009). Such a
perspective has consequences for the design of experi-
mental studies and other lines of research. For instance,
until recently motor planning has been studied in situa-
tions where participants carry out physical actions without
a particular purpose or overarching movement goal. Yet,
when one examines everyday life, it is apparent that our
physical interactions are normally planned and executed
with higher-order goals in mind. Therefore, we examined
whether two previously discovered motor planning phe-
nomena – the end-state comfort effect andmotor hysteresis –
would hold up when the actions were carried out in the
service of higher-order goals.
The end-state comfort effect is the tendency to avoid
awkward postures at the end of a movement (Rosenbaum
et al., 1990). This effect has been taken to support the
notion that people anticipate future body states.
Motor hysteresis is the tendency of the motor system to
switch from one state to another at different values
depending on its history (e.g. on previous sequential
movement order). The higher-order goal we chose to study
was memorization. In focusing on memorization, we asked
not only how motor planning is affected by the need to
memorize, but also how memory performance might
depend on the cognitive demands of motor planning. We
asked students to retrieve cups from a column of drawers
and memorize as many letters as possible from the insides
of the cups. The end-state comfort effect and motor hys-
teresis were replicated in these conditions, indicating that
the effects hold upwhen physical actions are carried out for
the sake of a higher-order goal. However, one of the most
reliable effects in memory research was eliminated,
namely, recency effect. Recent items were not recalled
better than items encountered earlier. This outcome was
not an artifact of memory being uniformly poor, because
the tendency of initial items to be recalled better than items
in the middle of the sequence – the primacy effect – was
obtained. The recency effect did not disappear because
participants had to recall items in their correct order, for it
was also eliminated when the items could be recalled in
any order. These and other aspects of our results support
recent claims for tighter links between basic mechanisms
of perceptual-motor control and cognitive (symbolic) pro-
cessing (representation of verbal information) than have
been assumed in the past (Weigelt et al., 2009). The results
support the idea that the interaction of cognitive and
perceptual-motor components in human action works at
different levels and is part of an overall architecture.
Another group of studies examined how the interaction
of task constraints and cognitive representation of goal-
related grasping postures (end-state comfort) inﬂuences
motor planning and execution in unimanual and bimanual
grasping tasks, in both children and adult populations
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Reißig, & Seegelke, 2011; Weigelt & Schack, 2010). The re-
sults from these studies have shown that task constraints
do not inﬂuence motor planning and motor execution
equally. For example, Hughes, Haddard, et al. (2011)
examined how physically connecting two objects might
inﬂuence bimanual grasping and placing movements. They
found that although object end-orientation congruency
inﬂuences both the grasping and transport components of
the task, physically connecting the two objects altered only
the degree of interlimb coupling between the hands (e.g.,
on a kinematic level).
Hughes, Haddard, et al. (2011) postulate that successful
task performance is contingent on the action goals of the
task, which guide the selection of lower level action fea-
tures (such as initial grasp postures), as well as the manner
in which the task is performed (e.g., its kinematics). In
particular, grasping and placing movements can be sepa-
rated into an initial grasp and a transport component,
within which there are a number of constraints that the
system seeks to satisfy. Taken together, these results indi-
cate that constraints may not exert equal effects on
grasping and transport components, and a more holistic
approach to human object manipulation may provide in-
sights that might not be apparent otherwise.
A further line of studies focuses on the cognitive back-
ground of motor performance in manual action (Schack &
Ritter, 2009), particularly during the rehabilitation of
hand function after a stroke (Braun et al., 2007, 2008). In
these studies we learned that central costs and interference
in manual actions depend solely on how these movements
are represented on a cognitive level.
Our recent research starts with the question of how
structures of sensory-motor representation are established
and changed step by step in compliance with task con-
straints. To examine how these constraints interact with
one another during manual actions in human beings and
robots, we ﬁrst investigated the development of structured
representation (action templates) in human skill acquisi-
tion, then applied these results to robots. For instance, to
learn in detail about anticipation and motor control in
children, we investigated the development of the end-state
comfort effect in young children aged 3, 4, and 5 (Weigelt &
Schack, 2010). The children performed a dowel placing
task, reaching for a horizontal dowel and inserting one of
its ends into a target disc. Although all children, regardless
of age, reached for the dowel with an overhand grasp when
this resulted in a comfortable end-state (i.e. thumb-up
posture), a different pattern emerged when an underhand
grip had to be selected. In this latter situation, only 18% of
the 3-year-olds, 45% of the 4-year-olds, and 67% of the 5-
year-olds used an underhand grip and ﬁnished the action
in a comfortable end-state. These results show a distinct
pattern of gradual improvement in children’s sensitivity to
end-state comfort across the three age-groups. Such in-
formation about basic principles of end-state comfort
planning in humans is of interest when designing valid
robot architectures that are used to performmanual actions
and interact with human beings in an appropriate, age-
dependent manner (Gienger, Toussaint, Jetchev, Bendig, &
Goerick, 2008).In a recent study we investigated anticipatory motor
planning and cognitive representation of grasp postures in
children aged 7, 8, and 9 years. Overall, 9-year-old children
were more likely than 7 or 8-year-olds to plan their
movements to end in comfortable postures, and to have
distinct representational structures for certain grasp pos-
tures. Additionally, sensitivity to comfortable end-states
was related to the mental representation of certain grasp
postures. Children with functionally well structured rep-
resentations related to grasp comfort were more likely to
have satisﬁed end-state comfort in both the simple and the
advanced planning condition. In contrast, children whose
cognitive representations were not structured by grasp
comfort achieved far less satisfaction with grasp comfort in
the advance planning condition. The results of the present
study support the notion that cognitive action represen-
tation plays an important role in the planning and control
of grasp postures (Stöckel et al., 2012).
The results of these studies show that dexterity in
manual action and task related object manipulation is
accompanied by order formation in memory. Such order
formation in action knowledge reduces the cognitive effort
required to activate relevant information. From this
perspective, we have to solve movement tasks purposefully
and in a step by step fashion within the framework of
voluntary organization of movement. So it is of interest to
learn about the task-related order formation of action
knowledge. We will provide an example concerning the
representation of objects with regard to manual actions in
an automobile mechanic’s workshop. The question is how
strong a relationship we will ﬁnd between the represen-
tation of object concepts (parts of a car) and the manual
expertise of mechanics in a workshop.
In line with our assumptions about BACs and the
structure and dimensioning (feature assignment) of action
representation (Schack & Ritter, 2009), we developed the
structure-dimensional analysis (SDA-M) of mental repre-
sentations (Schack, 2012). The SDA-M presents the
structure-dimensional relations of conceptually ordered
knowledge; psychometrically, for both single cases and
groups. The SDA method proceeds in four steps. First, the
splitting procedure involving the multiple sorting tasks
delivers a scaling of the distances among the BACs in the
predetermined set (i.e., verbal lists). Second, a hierarchical
cluster analysis transforms each set of BACs into a hierar-
chical structure. Third, a factor analysis reveals the di-
mensions in this structured set of BACs; and fourth, the
cluster solutions are tested for invariance within and be-
tween groups. (Psychometric details of the full procedure
are provided by Schack, 2012.) For the present study, only
the ﬁrst two steps are relevant:
1. Because it can be assumed that the structure of cognitive
representations can only be explicated to a limited
extent, the scaling of distance between concepts is done
with a special splitting technique. It is based on the se-
lection and presentation of a group of concepts that are a
valid component of that set of concepts that is absolutely
necessary for a certain problem-solving or working
domain. As in the methods mentioned above, this group
of concepts is initially identiﬁed through work analysis,
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example of research: For the work of an automobile
mechanic, we found these car parts as object concepts
related to manual action in the repair shop: (1) piston;
(2) cylinder; (3) valve; (4) cylinder head; (5) drive shaft;
(6) contact breaker; (7) ignition coil; (8) spark plug; (9)
distributor; (10) wheel mounting; (11) shock absorber;
(12) disc brake; (13) coil spring; and (14) leaf spring.
The experimental procedure took the N elements (in
this case,14) from the set of concepts and selected one as an
anchor towhich the other N 1 elements were assigned or
not assigned, according to an individually given similarity
criterion. This procedure (while retaining the original an-
chor) was repeated with each new positive or negative
subset until either there were just indivisible sets with one
object, or an individually selected break-off criterion was
attained at which the sets should not be broken down
further. Because each concept took the position of anchor
once, we obtained a total of N (14) decision trees whose
nodes contained the subsets produced and whose edges
had a negative or positive sign depending on whether the
elements were assigned to the anchor concept.
2. The structured relations among the N concepts were
obtained by compiling a distancematrix from the scaling
procedure and subjecting it to a hierarchical cluster
analysis.
Custom computer programs were developed to apply
this method so that such experiments could be carried out
within a reasonable time (10–15 min; Schack, 2012). Using
the SDA method presented above, we compared the action
knowledge of ﬁve mechanics working in a renowned
workshop (Daimler-Benz, BMW, Cologne) with the
knowledge of four sports students who had driver’s licen-
ses and automobiles but no relevant experience in repair-
ing them.
When repairing automobiles, mechanics continuously
have to solve problems that require a sound knowledge of
the vehicle’s major subsystems (electrical system, chassis,
engine) and the functions of their corresponding parts.
When repairing an engine, a mechanic has to discriminate
very clearly, even when just looking, between spare parts
that are relevant to the current job and any irrelevant parts
that may also lie within reach. The problem solving process
involved in diagnosing the damage to the vehicle and how
to repair it also requires functionally applicable knowledge
of systems and parts as well as the appropriate tools. We
found that the experts in this domain seemed to achieve
this effortlessly. However, when asked, they could not
report which sort of knowledge had enabled them to
perform this real-time problem solving or how their
knowledge was structured. Hence, we used a survey of
another group of experts (n¼ 3) and a functional analysis of
automobile construction to develop the list of concepts
reported above.
Concepts 1–5 refer to parts of the engine (and drive
train), Concepts 6–9 to the electrical system, and Concepts
10–14 to the chassis. These concepts were read into a
computer program, and participants performed theaforementioned split procedure. For all concepts, partici-
pants had to decide whether or not the concepts were
linked together functionally for carrying out actions during
their work. Concepts were presented in random order.
One major issue in the analysis was whether the degree
of structuring would be greater in the experts’ than in the
laypersons’ action knowledge. Another was which features
would be used to structure the concepts in memory.
Representative results of the hierarchical cluster analysis
from one expert are shown in Fig. 1.
As Fig. 1 shows, the expert has a strong hierarchical
knowledge structure with three concept clusters. Such
structuring points to a high degree of order formation in
the expert’s action knowledge. The content of this knowl-
edge structure is highly interpretable: Each cluster refers to
a speciﬁc subsystem of the vehicle: these cognitive sub-
structures, which refer to the representation units (con-
cepts) of the engine, electrical system, and chassis, are
highly distinct. As the results of the factor analysis show,
the features of these concepts are linked to problem-
solving processes within these action systems (engine,
electrical system, chassis). Hence, functional features of the
concepts determine the structure. The expert predomi-
nantly knows for what (for what purpose) the single parts
can be used. The results of this analysis will now be
compared with ﬁndings for a low performer (Fig. 2).
The knowledge structure depicted in Fig. 2 reveals poor
performance in the automobile repair domain. According to
self-reports and a test of automobile repair skills, this
person is only able to change awheel. Compared with what
is shown Fig.1, the knowledge system for the 14 concepts in
Fig. 2 is broadly unstructured. One cluster refers to the
chassis; this knowledge substructure seems to be due to
frequent wheel changes. Further substructures cannot be
recognized in Fig. 2. This also means that no structured
knowledge is available for other performance domains of
automobile repair (engine, electrical system).
This study shows clearly that performance is related to
the structuring of action knowledge. A comparable sys-
tematic structuring was found in all ﬁve experts. It is clear
that the structure is also functionally relevant, and the
performance ascertained is functionally efﬁcient for real-
time problem solving in the ﬁeld of automobile repair.
Such problem-solving processes are linked continuously
to speciﬁc movements, routines, and habits. Therefore, it
can be assumed that speciﬁc movement knowledge is
also attached to this object knowledge. The relation be-
tween movement representation and learning will now
be studied and discussed with an example from golf
playing.
4. Mental representations and learning in complex
movements
Mental (action) representation plays a central role
controlling and implementing actions. These processes
include storing the cognitive-perceptual outcomes of
learning processes as items in long-term memory. From
this point of view learning is nothing more than the
modiﬁcation and adaptation of representation structures in
memory.
(1) Piston, (2) cylinder; (3) valve; (4) cylinder head; (5) drive shaft; (6) contact breaker; (7) 
ignition coil; (8) spark plug; (9) distributor; (10) wheel mounting; (11) shock absorber; (12) 
disc brake: (13) coil spring; (14) leaf spring.
6.2
5.9
4.2
4.0
3.4
3.1
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2.5
2.3
1.0
13   12   10 14   11 1 3  5  4  2 9  6  7 8
chassis engine electrical system
Fig. 1. Results of the hierarchical cluster analysis of object concepts for a high-performance (expert) mechanic. The lower the value of a cross-connection between
the study units (see the Euclidean distance scale on the right), the shorter the distance between the concepts in long-term memory (a¼ .05, dcrit ¼ 3.42). dcrit is
the random critical distance between the concepts for a given a probability.
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structures and learning in more detail we designed a
learning study for golf (Frank, Land, & Schack, 2013). Putt-
ing was chosen as the relevant task. The basic action con-
cepts of the putt are: (1) shoulders parallel to target line:
(2) align club face square to target line: (3) check grip; (4)
look to the hole; (5) rotate shoulders away from the ball; (6)
keep arms–shoulder triangle; (7) make a smooth transi-
tion; (8) rotate shoulders toward the ball; (9) accelerate
club; (10) hit the ball; (11) keep club face square to target
line at impact; (12) follow through; (13) rotate shoulders(1) Piston, (2) cylinder; (3) valve; (4) cylinder he
ignition coil; (8) spark plug; (9) distributor; (10) 
disc brake: (13) coil spring; (14) leaf spring.
5   6  7  1  9  4  8 3 2  14 1
Fig. 2. Results of hierarchical cluster analysis forthrough the ball; (14) decelerate club; (15) direct club head
to planned position; and (16) look to the outcome. Partic-
ipants were instructed to sort the list of basic action con-
cepts according to their functional relevance during
movement execution. A hierarchical cluster analysis then
revealed individual and group mental representation
structures (for further information on the SDA-M, see
Schack, 2012). For the experiment, novice golfers were
randomly assigned to either a practice group (n ¼ 12) or a
control group (n ¼ 12). Both groups were tested before and
after an acquisition phase of three days as well as after aad; (5) drive shaft; (6) contact breaker; (7) 
wheel mounting; (11) shock absorber; (12) 
2    13  11 10
6.6
5.2
4.4
3.6
3.4
3.1
2.7
2.9
1.6
a low performer (layperson) in mechanics.
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completed the sorting task on three occasions: day one (the
pretest), day ﬁve (the posttest), and day six (the retention
test). Additionally, the experimental group performed 3
blocks of 20 putts each on day one (pretest), day ﬁve
(posttest) and day six (retention test). On days two, three
and four, the experimental group practiced the putting
task, which consisted of 10 blocks of 20 putts each with a
short break between every two blocks. No feedback on
technical issueswas given during putting, just the outcome.
The control group did not practice during this time.
Preliminary results (see Fig. 3) show changes in the
experimental group’s mental representation structure for
the putt: the representational structures during the pretest
showed no clustering of basic action concepts in the
group’s mean dendrogram, whereas both the posttest and
the retention test revealed changes in average mental
representation structure. Speciﬁcally, the experimental
group’s mean dendrogram displayed several clusters that
already point toward the functional structure of the
movement, which illustrates the development of functional
structure formation in memory. Because there was no
learning phase between posttest and retention test, the
cognitive structure of the individuals in the posttest is
statistically equivalent to the representation structure in
the retention test (on results of the invariance measure).
Meanwhile, the mental representation structure for the
control group did not reveal any changes between the pre-
and post-test, which both showed no clustering whatso-
ever of basic action concepts in the group’s mean dendro-
gram. In addition, while retention test for the control group
revealed a few clusters, these did not correspond mean-
ingfully to the functional demands of the task.
To learn about the relationship between cognitive rep-
resentation and performance in interaction we combined
an experiment with human learners and an interaction
scenario between human users and a technical platform
(offering a virtual human teacher). This study is presented
in the next section.Fig. 3. Measured mental representations for putting averaged across the ﬁrst ten s
results of the pretest are shown. No substructures (clusters) are statistically identiﬁe
are provided. The dendrogram for the posttest indicates four different clusters. N ¼5. Co-representation and joint attention in learning
To study the function of cognitive representation in
learning we used a new approach to study, as an initial
effort, the development of cognitive representations in the
context of interactions between an expert and novices in a
necktie-tying task. Based on previous research suggesting
that instructions about action sequences are better
memorized when they are offered with appropriate ges-
tures, we combined the motor learning task (tying the
necktie) with the demonstration of gestures. Over a three-
week learning period we measured the development of
mental representations prior to the experiment (pretest),
after eight sessions (in the middle of the second week),
after 15 sessions (at the end of the third week) and in a
retention test (one week after the posttest). Subsequently,
we implemented the results about the development of
cognitive representations in interaction to a technical
platform with a virtual agent. The participants have been
students. They didn’t know how to perform this particular
kind of necktie tying. An expert demonstrated the move-
ment and used verbal instructions and corrections to sup-
port the motor performance of the subjects. Analyzing
cognitive representation with the SDA-M method, we
deﬁned the following 13 units as relevant action sequences
or body postures.
1. Put the tie around the back of your neck, broad end on
the right.
2. Broad end is hanging farther down on the right.
3. Left hand holds narrow end in front of the upper body.
4. Right hand crosses broad end over the narrow end to
the left.
5. Change grasp – pull back to the right.
6. Left hand grabs half-formed knot.
7. Right hand pulls the broad end over, then underneath
the outer layer of the loop around the neck.
8. Wrap the broad end all the way around the narrower
end.ubjects (preliminary results) of the experimental group. On the left side the
d (below the critical value of 3.4). On the right side the results of the posttest
10, a¼.05, dcrit¼ 3.41.
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10. Right hand takes broad end and places it on ﬁngers of
the left hand.
11. Pass the broad end up from below, behind the knot,
through the loop around your neck.
12. Lean your head back.
13. Put the broad end underneath the outer layer of the
knot and tighten up the necktie.
Over the course of the three-week intervention, par-
ticipants became faster and more accurate in their perfor-
mance and were more successful at completing the task
after more trials. As can be seen in Fig. 4, the BACs for the
action sequence are more functionally clustered in the
posttest than they were in the pretest.
The cognitive representations in the post-test showed
that participants divide the BACs into four functional seg-
ments, whereas action representations prior to the
experiment (pretest) are less hierarchically organized and
show fewer functional segments. Furthermore, the previ-
ously singled out BACs observed in the pretest are now
integrated into the mental representation structure in the
posttest.
As a follow-up we implemented this cognitive interac-
tion scenario on a technical platform. The virtual human
being MAX (Lessmann, Wachsmuth, & Kopp, 2006) is
capable of integrating instructions with self-generated
gestures, promoting the formation of memory representa-
tions by the human listener. The quality of these repre-
sentations (structure, validity) is assessed by MAX (using
the SDA-M Method), yielding a measure of the listener’s
comprehension, which can in turn be used by MAX to
adjust its future use of particular instructions and gestures
in a closed-loop scenario (Fig. 5).
The main research questions are: 1) how well will a
human learner acquire action sequences taught by MAX;
and 2) will MAX learn to adjust his instructions based on
the feedback provided through measuring the structure of
the user’s mental representation? After completing this
study about co-representation and learning in interaction
we plan to implement speciﬁc instructional routines into
MAX that take differences in the user’s gender, age or cul-
tural background into account (Steggemann,Weigelt, Kopp,
Vogel, & Schack, 2011).Fig. 4. Adaptation of memory structures while learning to tie a necktie. On the pret
elements (5, 10) are not included in the representation structure, which reﬂects t
dendrogram indicates a task-oriented cognitive representation of the movement e6. Representations in robot architectures
Cognitive representations do not work in isolation:
control strategies, representations, and primitives chosen
at the “lower levels” provide the basis on which the higher
levels are constructed and strongly shape the problems to
be solved at those higher levels. There is a signiﬁcant body
of literature focusing on selected aspects of representations
for motor actions, such as contact formation, grasp opti-
mization, and ﬁnger gaits. But it is relatively little known
about the integration of these isolated aspects into an
overall, integrated architecture. A promising path toward
such an architecture marries recent methods and concepts
from cognitive psychology, for studying cognitive repre-
sentations of action, with ideas from cognitive robotics,
about integrating a rich set of skills in a systematic and
manageable fashion.
The case of cognitive human action control is a superb
working example of such an architecture, realized under
constraints that appear formidable from any engineering
standpoint. Different lines of development in cognitive
robotics (Maycock et al., 2010) have exposed interesting
parallels to a cognitively motivated architecture for human
motor action (Schack, 2004a, 2004b; Schack & Ritter, 2009).
This architecture addresses cognitive representations as a
part of an action system, postulating four levels: a senso-
rimotor level providing an interface to sensors and effec-
tors, two intermediate levels of sensorimotor and mental
representations, accommodating basic action units at
different levels of abstraction, and a topmost level of
mental control shaping our purposeful behavior (see Fig. 6).
This model has been our rationale for establishing a
research environment for studying manual interactions.
This enables us to explore correspondences between the
computational manual action architecture on the one side,
and the sensorimotor and mental representations levels of
the cognitive model on the other (see Fig. 6), and to bring to
bear methods from both disciplines to mutually reﬁne and
cross-connect the two accounts, with the aim of producing
a coherent and overarching picture of complex action and
especially of manual intelligence (see Maycock et al., 2010).
To bridge the gap between empirical research and ro-
botic design, we have to translate our ﬁndings from studies
of human movement into models sufﬁciently speciﬁc toest the dendrogram indicates a low-level representation of the activity. Some
he task structure (action sequences) only to low degree. In the posttest the
lements, N¼ 9; a ¼ .01; dcrit¼ 4.59.
Fig. 5. In a teacher-trainee scenario, the virtual agent MAX supervises the acquisition of short action sequences (e.g., tying a necktie) by verbally instructing
participants, signaling the movements with gestures, and assessing changes of mental representation during skill learning to provide feedback.
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botics side, we use several layers of representations,
ranging upward from specialized controllers at the lowest
level, to basis postures deﬁning set-points for the control-
lers, to manifolds that interpolate between basis postures,
to hierarchical state machines to switch between different
interaction regimes and, ﬁnally, to declarative, human-
readable XML speciﬁcations for the topmost level of sys-
tem structure. As part of a multilevel research strategy, we
have examined the hierarchical representation of objects
under different task constraints, and, complementary to
this, the hierarchical representation of grasping move-
ments between power and precision grips (Bläsing, Puttke,
et al., 2010; Bläsing, Schack, et al., 2010). Studies on the
cognitive representation of movement primitives (in the
form of BACs) helped us to further differentiate the tax-
onomy of grasps for which the robot hand is equipped. In
another research line we captured motion data for basis
hand postures in various grasping actions (Maycock et al.,
2010). Using small set of prototypical hand postures as
pre-grasps, we developed a robust method for grasping a
wide range of household objects (Röthling, Steil, & Ritter,
2007). This approach offers interesting cross-connections
with the concept of basic action units (BACs) and the re-
sults of the studies previously presented. In the studiesFig. 6. A tentative integration of cognitive (mental) representations in the architec
indicates possible implementations in a technical system. The ﬁgure is taken fromconcerning the representation of golf putting, necktie tying,
or manual actions we learned that BACs are integrated into
hierarchies, whose structure can be extracted with
specialized experimental methods (SDA-M), allowing to
further examine how these representations change during
learning. The insights gained in such experiments have
guided the implementation of computational strategies on
robotic platforms (i.e., a 7 degree of freedom robot arm set-
up; see Ritter, Steil, Noelker, Roethling, & McGuire, 2003;
Schack & Ritter, 2009).
Insights gained from the attempt to validate the hy-
pothesis about action and representation structures in
robot learning can be used strategically to inform the
design of experiments with human subjects. For instance,
to improve grasping by the robot hand and to learn about
the “granularity” of cognitive building blocks in manual
actions, we conducted experiments to gain more detailed
insight into the relationship between the structure of rep-
resentations and the performance of manual actions,
including situations in which the actions result in error
(Bläsing, Puttke, et al., 2010; Bläsing, Schack, et al., 2010;
Schack & Ritter, 2009).
Connecting research into the cognitive architectures of
human beings and robots are the cognitive benchmarks
(hierarchical representations) for manual actions, especiallyture of action. The left side indicates cognitively motivated levels; the right
Maycock et al. (2010).
T. Schack, H. Ritter / New Ideas in Psychology 31 (2013) 258–269268the representation of objects and grasping postures. The
kind of integrated (interdisciplinary) research that has been
described here allows us to explore experimentally the in-
teractions between action representation in memory (as
simulated with different kinds of artiﬁcial neural networks)
and motor skills in the context of real-world tasks (Krause
et al., 2009). The present studies of the mental representa-
tion of grasping postures in humans and other experimental
studies with the robot hand (Schack & Ritter, 2009) will
better enable us to make step by step reﬁnements in robot
hand grasping.References
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